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Many papers have shown that U.S. earnings inequality
increased substantially from about 1980 to around 1996.1
Recent and careful studies agree that a basic explanation
for increased earnings inequality is the rising returns to
human capital resulting from new technology. These rising
returns have meant that the relative earnings of some
of the best educated, and thus best paid, workers have
increased. Inequality has risen while the economy has grown
with unusual stability (at least after the 1980-82 cycle) and
while substantial growth has occurred in the fraction of
adults who are employed. Government data indicate that the
earnings of low-income and historically disadvantaged
workers rose faster in 1997 and 1998 than those of other
workers. The Economic Report of the President (U.S. Council of
Economic Advisers 1999) attributes the recent trend reversal
to extreme tightness in the labor markets. Whether this
reversal will continue if labor markets slacken seems doubt-
ful if indeed the underlying cause of growing earnings
inequality has been the rising returns to human capital.
It is worth mentioning that income inequality
certainly has increased more than earnings inequality.
Returns to corporate equities have averaged nearly 20 per-
cent per year during the 1990s. Although more than a
third of adult Americans now own corporate equities
(including those owned through pension plans), most are
still owned by people in the upper quarter of the income
distribution. The distribution of physical capital owner-
ship has been more unequal than that of human capital
ownership since estimates have been available, and
Heckman et al. (1998) provide evidence that rising returns
to human capital have induced students to stay in school
longer. However, the ratio of stock capitalization to GDP
has nearly tripled since the 1980s. The result must have
been a rising share of property income in total income
(see Hale [1999]). (Of course, capital gains must be
included in income.) Although earnings inequality has
increased in a few other countries more than in the
United States, it is almost certain that when income
inequality has increased more here than elsewhere it is
because of the astounding performance of U.S. equities
during the 1990s.
Thus, the facts are clear: earnings inequality has
increased for close to twenty years—until, perhaps, a
temporary reversal occurred starting in 1997—and
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income inequality has almost certainly increased more
than earnings inequality. Earnings inequality has increased
for a sound economic reason: rising returns to human capital
at least in part have been related to technical change. It is
patent that governments should encourage, not discourage,
technology and the resulting high returns to human capital.
How taxes should be levied on high earnings (relative to
low earnings) and on earned income (relative to property
income) is beyond the scope of this paper. But research dur-
ing the last decade or two should have convinced everyone
that all taxes affect economic behavior.
INEQUALITY AND METROPOLITAN 
STRUCTURE
Everyone knows that U.S. metropolitan areas have subur-
banized massively since World War II. In fact, during
most of the last century and in every metropolitan area,
suburbanization has increased in every part of the world
that has been studied (see Cheshire [forthcoming] and
White [forthcoming]). Although residences are more
suburbanized than businesses, both sectors have subur-
banized rapidly and substantially.
The causes of suburbanization have been studied
extensively. Agreement is widespread on the major causes,
but not on their relative importance (see Mieszkowski and
Mills [1993]). First, there is metropolitan growth: large
metropolitan areas are more suburbanized than small ones.
Second, there are high and rising incomes: high-income
metropolitan areas are more suburbanized than low-income
metropolitan areas, and high-income residents are more
suburbanized than low-income residents, at least in the
United States and in the few metropolitan areas elsewhere
for which requisite data are available. Third, residential
suburbanization leads to business suburbanization and vice
versa, with the former sequence being stronger than the
latter (see Carlino and Mills [1987]). Manufacturing is the
leading example of an important business sector that has
suburbanized (and exurbanized) in advance of residents.
Retailing and consumer services follow consumers to the
suburbs. Business services have suburbanized less than
most business sectors, and mostly to suburban subcenters
that are smaller versions of central business districts, or
CBDs (see White [forthcoming]).
Finally, and most controversially, there is the pre-
dominance of poverty, minorities, crime, poor schools, and
alienation in central cities. The fact that such characteris-
tics are anathema to the upper middle class should not be
news to anyone. But that does not make the case for such
characteristics as causes of suburbanization. 
First, large numbers of poor and alienated
minorities in central cities are predominantly a U.S.
phenomenon, and suburbanization has taken place in
virtually all other countries. Second, numbers matter. Sup-
pose that the alienated minority is a small fraction of the
metropolitan population—then presumably little subur-
banization would result from their presence in central cities.
Alternatively, suppose that alienated minorities are half the
population in a metropolitan area in which two-thirds of
the metropolitan population would live in the suburbs
even if there were no minorities. Then it seems likely that
about the same two-thirds would live in the suburbs even
if half the population were alienated minorities. 
In any case, retreat of nonpoor whites to the
suburbs cannot achieve its putative goals if alienated
minorities are as large a fraction of suburban residents as
they are of central-city residents. Some circumstances must
keep the alienated minorities in the central city. Poverty,
suburban land use controls, and racial discrimination in
suburban housing and employment are viewed as reasons
that minorities have remained in central cities in postwar
U.S. metropolitan areas. The latter two acts have been
illegal for more than thirty years, but certainly still exist in
attenuated degree (see Yinger [1995]). There is indeed
evidence that suburbanization has been greater in U.S.
metropolitan areas where the fraction of central-city resi-
dents that are minorities has grown (see Mills [1992]), but
I believe that the numbers of the poor and minorities have
had stronger effects on who has suburbanized than on how
many residents have suburbanized.
During the last half century, high-income whites
have led the march to the suburbs, followed by whites of
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some evidence (see Mills and Lubuele [1997]) that minori-
ties have followed whites to the suburbs in substantial
numbers since about 1980, also led by their highest
income members. My judgment is that the remaining
racial discrimination in suburban housing—and probably
in employment—is more a matter of class than of race, as
minorities are disproportionately low income.
I conclude this section with brief comments on
income levels of suburban relative to central-city residents.
Many writers bemoan evidence that central-city residents
have become poorer relative to suburban residents. The
observation is correct, but not very relevant. Suppose, as
is approximately true, that the highest income residents
suburbanize first, followed by residents in decreasing order
of income. Then the ratio of suburban to central-city
incomes will be greatest when the smallest and largest frac-
tions of residents live in the suburbs. When only a small
fraction of the metropolitan population has suburbanized,
the average income in the central city approximates that
in the entire metropolitan area, whereas the average
income in the suburbs is that of the metropolitan area’s
highest income residents. When nearly all of the metro-
politan area’s residents live in the suburbs, the average
income in the suburbs approximates that for the metro-
politan area, whereas the average income in the central
city is that of the metropolitan area’s poorest residents. At
both extremes, the ratio of suburban to central-city
incomes is high. 
Depending on the income distribution across a
metropolitan area, the ratio will be smallest when about
half of the residents live in each place. Since about two-
thirds of metropolitan area residents now live in the
suburbs, the suburban-to-central-city income ratio inevita-
bly increases as more people suburbanize. That is true even
if all of the metropolitan area residents’ incomes are
unchanged as suburbanization proceeds. That the average
earnings of the worst paid 20 percent of workers have fallen
relative to those of the best paid 20 percent is an important
social fact. But it is not implied by the rise in suburban to
central-city earnings as suburbanization proceeds, because
the population bases in the two places are shifting.
EFFECTS ON CENTRAL-CITY DEVELOPMENT
It has been indicated that employment has suburbanized
along with population during the last half century. About
half of metropolitan employment, along with two-thirds of
residents, is now located in the suburbs.
At least qualitatively, the reasons for business con-
centration in metropolitan areas, and especially in CBDs
and suburban subcenters, are now well understood. The
only advantage that metropolitan areas and their business
centers have over other locations is the proximity that
they afford for diverse economic activities.2 Large size,
crowding of activities, substitution of structural capital
for land in real estate development, and a high-quality
transportation and communication system imply that the
costs of moving people, goods, and messages among
businesses and between businesses and residences are lower
in large metropolitan areas than elsewhere.3 The most
dramatic example is CBDs, where the advantages of
face-to-face communication justify production on land
that may be 100 times as expensive as land fifteen to forty
miles away. Urban economists use the term “agglomeration
economies” to describe this phenomenon, but it sug-
gests a mystique that may disguise a prosaic notion.
Agglomeration economies have been measured repeatedly
in U.S. metropolitan areas and in a few metropolitan
areas elsewhere. Evidence suggests that a doubling of a
metropolitan area’s size increases the area’s total factor
productivity by 5 to 15 percent (see White [forthcoming]
and Eberts and McMillen [forthcoming]).4
An important reason for business suburbanization
is that modern transportation and communication tech-
nologies have reduced the costs of moving people, goods,
and messages over considerable distances. A second reason
is that CBDs have become large enough to exhaust the
advantages of location there. For example, nearly half of the
one million jobs located in the city of Chicago are in its
CBD, and 200,000 are located within about a mile of the
periphery of O’Hare Airport, by far the metropolitan
area’s largest subcenter, but not entirely in the city.
As noted, retailing and consumer services locate
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some extent, their employees, live there. Furthermore,
manufacturing has suburbanized and exurbanized largely
because most of its inputs and outputs are shipped by road,
and the suburbs and rural areas now have easy access to
other places by modern expressways—in most cases easier
access than central-city locations. In addition, modern
manufacturing technology requires relatively few employees,
freeing manufacturing from locations near a metropolitan
area’s large labor pool. The notion that manufacturing can
be induced to return to central cities is a fantasy of large-
city mayors.
The foregoing paragraphs explain most of the
pervasive reasons for business suburbanization, and have
nothing to do with central-city poverty, minorities, or
alienation. Nevertheless, most observers, myself included,
believe that employment in most central cities has
decreased more than can be accounted for by the aforemen-
tioned causes. During the quarter century that ended in
1996, jobs located in the city of Chicago fell 15 percent,
while total metropolitan area jobs increased 29 percent. If
the city’s employment had remained constant, 200,000
more jobs would now be there. During the same quarter
century, the city’s population declined 18 percent, while
the metropolitan area population increased 10 percent. (As
is true for the country as a whole, employment per capita
increased both in the city and, especially, in the entire
metropolitan area.) Fragmentary evidence indicates that
since 1996, jobs located in Chicago and some other central
cities have increased.5 
Conditions that have changed recently may provide
insight into the dynamics of central-city employment
change during the last thirty to forty years. What has
happened recently? First, the entire economy now has
tighter labor markets than it has had for about thirty-five
years. Businesses may be locating in central cities for the
same reasons that U.S. businesses have been locating in
Mexico and East Asia, such as the availability of many
kinds of workers at wages that cannot be matched in most
of the U.S. economy. Employing central-city minorities,
however, presents problems: many are poorly educated,
many cannot speak or read English well, and many have
little or no work experience. These problems are also
faced in Mexico and other developing countries, and
perhaps U.S. firms are learning to cope with them better
than previously. 
Second, and important in Chicago and other old
centers of heavy industry, is the reform of brownfields lia-
bility. For a quarter century, the Environmental Protection
Agency administered a law that imposed unlimited liability
on anyone who owned, developed, produced, or even
financed production on sites that had been polluted in
earlier years, in some cases even before there were environ-
mental laws. Needless to say, significant parts of central
cities have remained unused for many years as a result. At
last, cities have been permitted by federal legislation to
remove or limit the liability of developers or producers for
environmental damages that occurred before their involve-
ment with a site. Of course, many conditions surround
this provision. Nevertheless, the removal or limitation of
liability for damages that developers were not responsible
for and could not estimate has resulted in a large influx of
firms that want to redevelop brownfields (see Arthur
Andersen LLP [1998]). I do not know how important
better brownfields remedies are likely to be, but the
Chicago effects are certainly helped by the fact that other
available sites may be thirty to fifty miles from the CBD.
In addition, as indicated above, potential workers are avail-
able near brownfields that may not be available elsewhere
in tight labor markets. Brownfields redevelopment in
Chicago is being carried out mostly for business projects,
but by no means mostly by manufacturing firms. 
Third, everybody knows that crime rates have
fallen in the 1990s, especially in central cities, more than
can be accounted for by demographic changes. (Most serious
crimes are committed by males between sixteen and thirty
years of age, and their numbers fell during the 1990s.)
Nobody who has ever tried to help businesses locate in
central cities can doubt that among the deterrents are fear
of arson, theft, vandalism, and attacks on female employees
on the way to and from work. It is merely facing the facts
to observe that about half of the black males in the high-
crime-age range are under the supervision of the criminal
justice system (see Freeman [1996]). It is also merely
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discriminated against by the criminal justice system just
as they have been discriminated against by housing and
employment markets (see Thernstrom and Thernstrom
[1997]). These issues are much too complex to analyze
here, but decreases in employment discrimination and
crime rates have presumably made businesses more will-
ing to locate in central cities. Presumably, the steadily
improving educations of minority groups, to some extent
motivated by rising returns to human capital, have also
increased businesses’ willingness to locate in central cities. 
CENTRAL-CITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS
What about central-city economic development programs?
Here I can report only pessimism. During the last two
or three years and for the first time in a decade or so,
developers have wanted to build office buildings, hotels,
and a substantial number of dwellings in many central
cities. I first illustrate responses in Chicago, since this is the
only evidence yet available. I then suggest what I believe
to be rather obvious directions for local government
policies to promote central-city economic development.
The Chicago city government generally recognizes
that prosperity requires it to improve the human capital
of its residents, especially by upgrading its public schools
from their dire straits of a few years ago. Yet it has consis-
tently gone against this principle by downzoning residen-
tial densities in its highest income neighborhoods. About
4 percent of the city’s population lives in the city’s highest
income census tracts. These are within a mile or so of Lake
Michigan and stretch from the CBD about five miles
north. Residential zoning in that area now permits densi-
ties of only about half of those permitted in 1950. The city
fears that additional high-rises in that area would create
“intolerable congestion.” This claim is dubious, given that
off-street parking has long been required of developers, that
the area is well served by public transit to the CBD, and
that those zoned out of the near north area are the ones
most likely to live in the north shore or western suburbs,
from which most CBD workers commute ten to twenty-
five miles on congested expressways. Presumably, some of
the city’s job loss has occurred because business services
have increasingly decided that having locations in sub-
urban subcenters is better than requiring their employees to
make the trip to the CBD.
Chicago’s low-income residents presumably have
no direct interest in low-cost housing for high-income
residents on the near north side. But the city government
has an interest in the taxes that high-income residents
pay—in the form of making the city a desirable place for
high-income people to live and in the jobs that high-
income residents create.6 
Turning to direct local government effects on
businesses, city (and all of Cook County) taxes on business
real estate are about three times as high per dollar of market
value as those on single-family dwellings. City business
(including many nuisance) taxes are higher than those in
suburbs outside Cook County, but I suspect that high taxes
are no more harmful than the business development strate-
gies to which they lead. Most communities, including
most especially the city of Chicago, seek nonresidential
ratables precisely because they generate more tax revenues
relative to costs of the government services that they
receive than do dwellings. This leads communities to “bid”
for businesses by offering them “incentives” of an enormous
variety: tax increment financing, temporary relief from
taxes, relaxation of land use controls, subsidized financing,
and so on. If a developer wants to build a high-rise com-
mercial structure in Chicago, he or she will need a couple
of years and much high-priced legal, environmental,
political, public relations, financial, and accounting talent
to obtain the needed permissions, and will end up with
permission to build at no more than half or two-thirds the
density first proposed.7
Some studies conclude that economic incentive
programs result in net job creation and some conclude that
they do not. However, almost no studies take account of
the fact that state and local governments must balance
their budgets, so that subsidies to some businesses require
higher taxes on other groups, with offsetting effects (see
Bartik [1991] and Mills [1997]).
None of the above antidevelopment strategisms is
peculiar to Chicago. Undoubtedly, some other central cities
are worse and some are better. And many suburbs are no138 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
better. A few small, high-income suburbs do not permit
businesses to locate in their jurisdictions on any terms. A
few low-income inner suburbs, mostly in Cook County in
the Chicago area, are desperate for businesses and nearly
give away the farm to seduce them to locate there. But in
most metropolitan areas, central cities have lost jobs in
competition with their suburbs while the suburbs have
gained them.
How many jobs and how much tax revenue have
central-city antidevelopment actions cost the central cities?
No one can possibly know. The qualitative and disparate
nature of many actions makes quantitative estimates nearly
impossible. I suspect that Chicago, although larger than
most, is typical of many central cities in the country. Press
accounts persuade me that at least Trenton, Newark, New
Orleans, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.,
have had worse antibusiness policies during most recent
decades—to use a few striking examples. 
What are appropriate economic development
strategies for central cities? I believe the answer is obvious.
Start with the axiom that central cities are in permanent
and intense competition, not only with their suburbs, but
with every other metropolitan area in the country and with
numbers of metropolitan areas in other countries that
increase every year or so. A second axiom is that generous
earnings will continue to accrue mostly to workers with
substantial human capital. The conclusion is that central
cities should do everything they can to increase the supply
of and demand for human capital within their borders.
The only alternative is to place the emphasis on handouts,
which are politically attractive in important respects but
result in neither substantial incomes nor self-sufficient
residents. 
Recent emphasis on human capital makes it nearly
inevitable that local governments will try to entice busi-
nesses that they think will attract, improve, or retain
human capital in the labor force. Local governments have a
long history of attempts to attract “winners” among busi-
nesses. They have established various kinds of technology
parks, preferably near colleges and universities, believing
that they could outguess the market as to what businesses
would thrive in their communities. Many were mostly
vacant for many years until local governments sold or
leased them to any businesses that would occupy them.
State and local governments wasted taxpayers’ money to
subsidize the attraction of businesses to the community.
Fads have come and gone for high-tech, software, biotech,
venture capital, and other ill-defined business groups. In
the most successful development programs, governments
identified a trend and called it a policy, but mostly govern-
ments identified the previous decade’s winners and wasted
taxpayers’ money to attract them after their employment
growth spurt had abated.
Local governments cannot outguess markets as to
what businesses will thrive in their communities. Business
location decisions are among the riskiest and, when success-
ful, best rewarded business decisions. Local governments
have neither the expertise nor the incentive to make location
decisions wisely. These strictures apply as much to
attempts to promote businesses dependent on human
capital as to attempts to promote any other kinds of
business developments.
The best economic development policy would be
to adopt a neutral pro-business policy. That sounds innocent,
but it contrasts vividly with many central-city government
attitudes toward businesses in which they are regarded
as public enemies, as geese to be plucked, as servants of
government officials from whom campaign contributions
can be obtained, or as places where government officials’
relatives can get jobs. A pro-business policy should entail
removal of all unneeded regulations. Local governments
should have a few transparent and important require-
ments that all businesses must follow, modest taxes, and
nothing else for business policies. They should relax or
remove zoning restrictions on businesses and housing.
Regarding human capital development, local
government policies must start with improvements in ele-
mentary and secondary education. Everybody should know
that children in poverty reach ages four or five a couple of
steps behind other children. This has to do with family
structure and neighborhood conditions in poverty areas.
There really is not much that local governments can do
about these things other than to enable poor children to
improve their prospects through better education. ManyFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 139
children in low-income neighborhoods are difficult to
educate. Nevertheless, public schools in the poor areas of
many large central cities are of poor quality. Improvements
require higher quality and more dedicated teachers and
administrators. Many school programs have shown that
expecting children to succeed and providing good learning
opportunities produce good results.
The fact that the children in poor neighborhoods
are difficult to educate does not mean that nothing can be
done. Opposition to reform by teachers’ unions is only part
of the problem. In big cities, the education bureaucracy is
politically powerful, mostly because it is a strong lobby
that influences many voters. Charter schools are a big help,
but the best reform would be a comprehensive voucher
program in which public schools (as with private schools)
have to attract enough students to pay their costs, includ-
ing rental costs of facilities, or they would have to sell or
rent the facilities to private schools. It would then be possi-
ble to promote competitive schooling with almost no con-
struction of new facilities. Private schools would have to
comply with nondiscrimination rules, as they do now, and
with elementary state requirements on educational quality.
They should also be eligible for whatever special assistance
for handicapped children that public schools can receive. 
There would be little danger that private schools
would skim off the best students, leaving public schools
with those who are most difficult to educate. In some large
cities, private schools already skim off many of the best
students. At a minimum, a good voucher program would
enable them to dip down further into the student quality
distribution. Many private schools would make special
efforts to attract students with poor backgrounds. Public
and private schools anywhere in a metropolitan area should
be eligible and encouraged to enroll students with vouchers
from anywhere in the area. Vouchers would have to be suffi-
cient to pay for a decent education, but schools should be
allowed to set tuition at levels exceeding the vouchers’
value and to grant needs-based scholarships. A voucher
program would have to be state-authorized.
A high-quality educational system does not entail
focusing just on students who can become scientists,
doctors, and lawyers. There are many kinds of human
capital, and students should be able to experiment with
several kinds. High-quality instruction can teach most
students to read, write, and do arithmetic by the time they
are in the third grade, although some now spend twelve
years in public school without learning those skills. All
students should be enabled to become comfortable with
elementary computer operations. Students must be held
to reasonable standards and must be able to perceive
that educational and business opportunities await them
if they succeed.
Of course, the streets should be safe. Most
Americans do not appreciate the close connection between
illegal drugs and street crimes. Not only have we impris-
oned 1 percent of the adult population, but also many
prisons are predominantly inhabited by drug offenders. In
my view, illegal drugs have filled and corrupted the prisons
(in some, these drugs can be bought almost as easily as on
the public streets) and have infiltrated the police and courts
as well as many local governments. Illegal drugs are also
a major reason for street gangs, just as prohibition was a
major cause of criminal activity in the 1920s, with similar
consequences.
The war on drugs is not showing signs of success.
Because of this, it is my belief that illegal drugs should
be available at about cost, and in modest quantities, upon
convincing an appropriate medical authority of need. By
taking the profit out of drugs, we would reduce crime and
corruption and probably addiction, since it would undercut
the profitability of sales promotion by providers of illegal
drugs, and would place users under the supervision of
medical professionals. It would also reduce perceived racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system. Illegal
drugs are almost as easily available in many suburbs as
they are on central-city streets. But middle-class offenders
rarely go to jail; they are placed in rehabilitation pro-
grams, put on probation, or kept out of prison through
legal maneuverings.
Finally, if central cities increase the supply of
human capital through better education and a better
criminal justice system, and increase the demand for
human capital through better pro-business policies, they
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paid residents. Reduced business regulations would
enable businesses to serve the needs of residents better
throughout the income distribution. Reduced controls on
residential development would enable relatively high-
income residents to live where and how they wish.
Many central cities could also dramatically
improve their transportation systems at little or no cost
(under present arrangements, the federal government
would pay for much of the cost) to enable both city and
suburban residents to move around cities more easily. Bus
systems should be opened to private companies. (It is done
successfully and with considerable savings in many places.)
Operation of fixed-rail transit systems should be contracted
to private businesses. Construction of highways in central
cities is unjustified on both economic and political grounds.
But the capacity of city streets and roads could be increased
through: carefully designed systems of reverse-direction
streets and lanes, sequenced traffic lights, much higher
charges for on-street parking (coupled with decontrol of
private off-street parking facilities), better traffic law
enforcement and, by federal action, much higher and more
reasonable motor vehicle fuel taxes (the substantial reve-
nues from which should revert to local governments in
exchange for agreements to reduce distorting property
taxes).
Local governments must, as must all governments
in our imperfect democracy, respond to the wishes of their
constituents. In recent years, partly because of pervasive
regulation, central-city governments have spent too much
of their energies arguing over minor concessions to this
group or that group. Probably more important, they
dissipate too much of their resources on stadiums, conven-
tion centers, hospitals, and other business investments that
would be better left to the private sector. I believe that
they should at least undertake serious taxpayer education,
debates, and election campaigns on long-run issues related
to economic development. Nothing that federal, state, or
local governments can or at least should do will reverse the
trend of suburbanization. Recent national debate about
“controlling urban sprawl” will further divert resources to
unproductive uses and will spawn more unproductive
regulations.ENDNOTES
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The author is indebted to the conference participants for valuable comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
1. See Heckman et al. (1998) and U.S. Council of Economic Advisers
(1999). Different authors employ different measures of earnings
inequality, but virtually all careful studies show that the worst paid
20 to 35 percent of workers have experienced smaller earnings increases
than other workers. Earnings inequality has increased not only for
workers as a whole, but also within racial, gender, and sectoral groups.
2. This is not quite true. Metropolitan areas are located on relatively flat
land with better access to water for their needs than other places. Location
on navigable waterways is still of some importance, but most
intermetropolitan movement now takes place by motor vehicles, trains,
and airplanes, and is not very dependent on geographical conditions.
3. The statement is true even if travel in CBDs and in some sub-
centers is slow, as it is. The relevant measure is the cost of movement
between origin and destination. That cost is low even if travel is slow,
provided that origin and destination are near each other. Even if
communication is by modern electronic means, facilities are best in
large metropolitan areas.
4. Intrametropolitan transportation and communication inputs are of
course among the relevant inputs. Increasing total factor productivity is
reported partly because the most costly transportation input, time spent
traveling, is unmeasured.
5. Population and employment data in these paragraphs are from
Gaquin and Littman (1998), Woods and Poole (1997), and the Illinois
Department of Employment Security (1997).
6. There is direct evidence on the jobs issue. The northern end of
Michigan Avenue contains one of the world’s finest walkable shopping
areas (including seven fine vertical department stores and dozens of
boutiques), about ten of the city’s finest hotels, and a booming office
development sector. Nobody knows how much the prosperity of the area
depends on the high-income residents of the near north, but it must be
considerable. Zoning densities can easily be verified from city zoning
maps.
7. A couple of years ago, a developer proposed a mixed-use project for
one of the prime undeveloped sites in the city, just north of the Loop
and near the mouth of the Chicago River; the city, with the mayor’s
approval, finally authorized the project, which was downsized by about
a third because of the “congestion” that it would have created. When
asked if the city did not think that the extra jobs and taxes would be
missed, a city official said he “hadn’t heard any complaints from the
developer.”142 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 NOTES
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